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Deeper fiscal integration within the eurozone would
significantly alter the concept of a two-speed Europe. George
Osborne’s support signals an important U-turn in British
policy on the EU.
Olaf Cramme  discusses George Osborne’s seeming inclination to encourage greater
fiscal integration in the eurozone, which would indicate a significant realignment of UK
policy in relation to Europe.
Policy U-turns in the UK coalition government have so far been a matter for the Liberal
Democrats – or at least so it is perceived by the public. Among them, the scrapping of the
gender pay audits, the dropping of plans for a job or training guarantee and the reform of
higher education funding have stood out. The political consequences are well known:
large-scale university protests against the increase in tuition fees have deeply unsettled Deputy Prime
Minister Nick Clegg and his party are currently trailing at a mere 10 per cent in the polls. For disillusioned
supporters, this was not about abandoning a simple electoral pledge against the background of a changing
financial situation, but a radical departure from a long-standing principle.
In recent weeks the Conservatives have offered a very different image of U-turns – one which is supposed to
bring political dividends instead of brickbats. When the Chancellor George Osborne said that the UK
government should be prepared to let greater integration happen in the euro area, he seemed to reverse a
position held dear by Britain’s ruling elite over decades, namely that it should always have a seat at the EU’s
top table and therefore oppose any integrationist steps which could undermine this. In other words, a ‘two-
speed Europe’, with some member states pressing ahead in certain policy areas, was acceptable as long as
it did not affect the power balance inside the EU’s central decision-making institutions, such as the European
Council.
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Past experience had shown that flexible integration was perfectly
compatible with this fundamental concern. Indeed, Europe’s most
spectacular advances, such as the euro, the Schengen area or
defence cooperation, were all based on some form of flexibility,
allowing a group of member states to pioneer while others decided
to stand back or opt out. None of these advances led to significant
political spill-overs in policy areas which remained to a large extent
subject to unanimity, such as the Single Market. This equilibrium of
forces was facilitated by a carefully balanced implementation and
interpretation of “two-speed Europe”, made up of at least three
different models.
First, there is multi-speed integration. This approach is
based on the assumption that all EU member states
essentially agree on a defined objective or common policy
but differ in either the technical capacity or political disposition to introduce the required changes. The
existence of a ‘two-speed Europe’ is thus considered to be only temporary and transitional, and not in
lasting contradiction to the consensus-driven nature of EU policy-making.
Second, there is what has been described as ‘Europe à la carte’. From this perspective, the EU
legitimises itself by allowing greater political choice on the policy areas to be deepened. The key
characteristic is to accept persistent diversity while allowing member states to join or leave a particular
policy regime at any time. Although there are certainly limits to how this model can be applied across
the entire acquis communitaires, it allows far-ranging experimentation of where the EU can genuinely
add value.
Third, there is the idea of ‘concentric circles’, giving expression to the desire of some countries to
integrate much faster and deeper than others. In this account, an “avant-garde” creates a super-
ordinate system of governance within the existing EU structures to facilitate the creation of an inner
core, recognising the incompatibility between certain policy objectives surrounding the European
project. The consequence is a two-tier order in which the preferences and values are largely shaped
by those on the first tier given the predominance of their common interests and concerns.
As a matter of fact, these models of flexibility differ in both means and ends. But they are not mutually
exclusive in the complex set-up of the EU. For instance, even the introduction of the euro contains elements
of all three models: it demands states which enter the convergence mechanism to join once the criteria are
met; it granted countries such as the UK or Sweden an opt-out without excluding admission at a later stage;
and it incentivises a regime where restricted bodies, like the euro group, gradually acquire more rights and
powers.
The question now is whether such a division between different conceptions of ‘two-speed Europe’ remains
attainable at all, if the eurozone follows Mr. Osborne’s advice to embark on some path of fiscal federalism,
including Eurobonds. The evidence points in the opposite direction.
Take the example of the ‘Euro-Plus-Pact’. Conceived of by the Franco-German couple in order to tighten
coordination on economic policy among euro members, the pact quickly gained followers from beyond the
currency club – partly because of fear of exclusion, partly because of similar interests. Only four countries
resisted, including the UK. In this case, there appears to be neither a common destination nor is there much
space for diversity or experimentation. As a result, the number of models to be applied is basically reduced
to one – albeit less out of choice but of sheer necessity.
If this direction of travel continues, or is reinforced by a treaty change to allow for deeper fiscal integration,
‘two-speed Europe’ is likely to get a new meaning. Gone will be the principle of internal openness with which
the EU has so far managed to balance diverging objectives. Instead, non-euro members unwilling to adopt,
or at least tolerate, the preferences of the core group will increasingly find themselves in a position of
confrontation, facing the negotiated decisions of the majority. In extreme cases, the outer lane might even
resemble more Switzerland than full membership of the Union.
Of course, Britain as a new Switzerland is precisely what a number of Conservatives (and also Labour
politicians) would want to see. But this vision completely misreads how power is actually distributed between
EU and non-EU countries. Then, the U-turn would be truly completed. Mr. Osborne would therefore do well to
spell out more clearly what the government’s policy on Europe is designed to achieve in the long-run. The
consequences are bound to be huge, but are yet ill-understood by policy-makers and the public alike.
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